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Abstract The article considers JürgenHabermas’s views on the relationship between
postmetaphysical philosophy and religion. It outlines Habermas’s shift from his ear-
lier, apparently dismissive attitude towards religion to his presently more receptive
stance. This more receptive stance is evident in his recent emphasis on critical engage-
ment with the semantic contents of religion and may be characterized by two interre-
lated theses: (a) the view that religious contributions should be included in political
deliberations in the informally organized public spheres of contemporary democra-
cies, though translated into a secular language for the purposes of legislation and for-
mal decision making and (b) the view that postmetaphysical philosophy should seek
to salvage the semantic contents of religious traditions in order to supply the evocative
images, exemplary figures, and inspirational narratives it needs for its social and polit-
ical projects. With regard to (a), it argues that the translation requirement impairs the
political autonomy of religious believers and other metaphysically inclined citizens,
suggesting that this difficulty could be alleviated by making a distinction between
epistemologically authoritarian and non-authoritarian religious beliefs. With regard
to (b), it argues that the salvaging operation is not as straightforward as Habermas
seems to suppose and that social and political philosophy may not be able to tap the
semantic power of religious traditions without relying on metaphysical assumptions;
it concludes that, here, too, a distinction between authoritarian and non-authoritarian
approaches to knowledge and validity may be useful.
Keywords Habermas · Religion · Postmetaphysical thinking · Public sphere ·
Semantic resource
In a number of recent essays Jürgen Habermas examines the relationship between
religion and philosophy, in particular, between religion and those modes of social and
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political philosophy that are guided by what he calls a “postmetaphysical” impulse.1
In the present context, the most important feature of postmetaphysical thinking as
understood by Habermas is its agnosticism with regard to the validity of religious
beliefs. This agnosticism is based on the theses that philosophical truth claims—like
the truth claims of science and universalist morality—must be capable of being sup-
ported publicly by reasons that everyone, everywhere could come to accept and that
religious convictions are not capable of being supported publicly by such reasons. A
second important feature of postmetaphysical thinking, closely related to the first,
is its rejection of ideas of transcendence in a metaphysical, “otherworldly” sense;
accordingly, the reference point for its claims to validity is not something beyond
human practices and human history, but internal to them. This is not to say that post-
metaphysical thinking rejects transcendent reasoning. To the contrary, it is crucial to
Habermas’s project of a critical theory of society that postmetaphysical reason has a
context-transcending power that enables it to call into question the specific practices,
judgments, and standards of validity that prevail in any given sociocultural context
at any particular time.2 Importantly, however, the source of its context-transcending
power is notmetaphysical but “innerworldly”; this is whyHabermas describes the con-
text-transcending power of postmetaphysical reason, which he claims is immanent to
the communicative practices of everyday life, as “transcendence fromwithin”.3 Given
Habermas’s advocacy of postmetaphysical thinking, with its agnosticism regarding the
truth of religious beliefs and its innerworldly character, one might expect him to be
dismissive of religious language, religious teachings, and religious practices. In the
early 1980s this appeared to be the case. In The Theory of Communicative Action,
published in German in two volumes in 1981, Habermas presents the disenchantment
and disempowering of the domain of the sacred as an unequivocal gain for human-
ity. (See, for example Habermas, 1987, p. 77). By the end of that decade, however,
he occasionally acknowledges the—at least, temporary—importance of religion as a
semantic resource for postmetaphysical philosophy. For example, in the concluding
passage of a 1988 essay he remarks that even postmetaphysical thinking will be able
“neither to replace nor to repress religion, so long as religious language is the bearer
of a semantic content that is inspiring and even indispensable”; to be sure, he also hints
that its indispensability might be the result of a deficiency in the explanatory force
of philosophical language that might someday be overcome. (Habermas, 1992, p. 51.)
Around this time, in a discussion with philosophers of religion and theologians, he
displays similar signs of a cautious openness to the relevance of religion for postmeta-
physical thinking: here he observes that the process of critical appropriation of the
essential contents of themajor religious traditions is still in train and that its results are
hard to foresee (Habermas, 1991, p. 141). His willingness to allow for the continuing
relevance of religion is coupled, however, with an insistence that postmetaphysical
philosophy cannot engage with questions relating to the validation of religious truth
claims: instead, postmetaphysical philosophymaymake use of the semantic resources
of religion only if it translates these contents into a neutralizing language and adopts
an attitude of “methodological atheism” with regard to their validity. (pp. 136–139).
1 See Habermas (2003a, 2005a) For Habermas’s account of postmetaphysical thinking see Habermas
(1992).
2 Habermas (1996). pp.1–9. See also Cooke (1994, 2006a).
3 Habermas (1991, pp.127–156) In Habermas (1996), he refers to the power of communicative reason
as “innerworldly transcendence” (p. 5).
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Scattered remarks of this kind from his writings of the late 1980s herald a shift in
Habermas’s position that is evident in a number of essays dealing with religion in rela-
tion to postmetaphysical thinking that have appeared in the past 5 years.1 The tone
of these essays is noticeably less cautious concerning the question of the importance
of religion as a semantic resource. Moreover, the change in tone is accompanied by
a new call for the inclusion of contributions expressed in religious language in public
debates in contemporary democracies. (See Habermas, 2005b). He now makes a plea
for a post-secular, democratic, public sphere in which participants in discussion would
be open to the cognitive contents of religious as well as non-religious contributions.
This attitude of openness is required of citizens with, as he puts it, light metaphysical
baggage, as well as of citizens who are metaphysically more heavily burdened. (See
Habermas, 2005g, p. 270). secularly minded citizens are required to adopt a self-criti-
cal attitude towards the limits of secular rationality and strive to be open to the power
of religious reasons; religiously minded citizens are required to acknowledge the sec-
ular basis of political authority and to accept the validity of core liberal democratic
principles such as equality and liberty.4
Habermas mentions two reasons for his shift in position (Habermas, 2003b). The
first is that recent developments in biotechnology (particularly in the field of genetic
engineering) threaten an instrumentalization of human nature that fundamentally
endangers our understanding of ourselves as members of the human species. They
raise the question of whether this instrumentalization can be countered without the
semantic resources of religious thinking. The second is that the terrorist attacks by
fundamentalist Islamic militants from September 11th 2001 onwards indicate a wide-
spread disenchantment with Western models of societal modernization. They raise
the question of whether a process of modernization that is in danger of de-railing can
be rescued with purely secular means. It seems, therefore, that Habermas’s new call
for the inclusion of religious contributions in democratic deliberation is motivated in
significant measure by societal developments that have led to a greater appreciation
of the need for postmetaphysical thinking to draw on the semantic resources of the
major religious traditions.
Habermas hints at a further motivating factor when he distinguishes his new posi-
tion from John Rawls’s view of the place of religion in democratic deliberation: the
need to avoid a split between the identities of individual citizens as participants in
political processes and their identities as religious believers. Like a number of other
commentators (See for example, Cooke, 2000; McCarthy, 1994). Habermas sees this
as a problem with Rawls’s approach.
As is well known, in Rawls’s model of political liberalism, citizens are required to
leave behind their religious worldviews when they engage in deliberation and deci-
sion-making in the public, political domain. Rawls argues that in a secular state, only
those political decisions can be held to be legitimate that can be justified by rea-
sons that are generally acceptable to all (“reasonable”), citizens (See Rawls, 1993),
whether they be religious believers or non-believers and whatever particular religious
convictions they may hold. This principle is central to Rawls’s argument in Political
Liberalism. However, he modifies it in a subsequent essay by introducing a distinction
between political discussions among politicians and officials concerned to formulate
and justify laws and principles and political discussions in the public sphere. (Rawls,
1997). Whereas the principle applies strictly in the case of the former, he concedes
4 Habermas (2005a), pp. 10–12 and Habermas (2005b), pp. 142–144.
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that it may be relaxed in the case of the latter to allow, temporarily, for religious
contributions. Thus, in political discussions in the public sphere, religious and other
comprehensive doctrines, on condition that they are “reasonable”, may be introduced
at any time, “provided that in due course proper political reasons—and not reasons
solely given by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to support
whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support” (p. 784).
Habermas points out that Rawls’s conception of public reason imposes an intol-
erable psychological burden on the inhabitants of liberal democratic orders, for it
obliges them to divorce their identities as religious believers from their identities as
democratic citizens. When they put on their citizens’ caps and engage in political dis-
cussions in the public domain, participants are required to distance themselves from
the comprehensive doctrines that shape their identities andonwhich they draw in their
deliberations in all non-public contexts. In consequence, a burdensome psychologi-
cal split between the public and non-public components of identity seems inevitable.
Habermas rebukes Rawls for overlooking the pivotal role that religion plays in the
life of religious believers. He points out that, for religious believers, religious faith is
not just a doctrine with a specific content, it constitutes a source of energy that nour-
ishes and invigorates their entire lives (Habermas, 2005b, p. 133). Concerned to avoid
a psychological burden of the sort Rawls imposes, Habermas calls for a democratic
public sphere in which religious and non-religious contributions would be granted an
equal hearing in discussions. To be sure, his shift in position regarding the inclusion of
religious contributions in processes of democratic deliberation does not extend to the
“official” political sphere of democratic legislation and decision-making in which, as
for Rawls, only arguments formulated in a secular language are permissible. I come
back to this point below.
Habermas’s call for the inclusion of religious contributions in processes of dem-
ocratic deliberation not only contrasts with Rawls’s model of political liberalism; it
is new within the context of his own theory of law and democracy. In Between Facts
and Norms, his major work in this area, first published in 1992, Habermas made no
reference to the public discussion of religious convictions. Strikingly, in his discus-
sion of the various types of public discourses that feed into democratic legislative
and decision-making processes, religious discourses—or discourses in which religious
contributions play a key role—are not mentioned (Habermas, 1996, pp. 157–168).
This is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that the book makes use of a con-
ception of discourse that is considerably more generous than the one found in The
Theory of Communicative Action. In that work, Habermas had restricted the cate-
gory of discourse, understood as validity-oriented, public debate guided by idealizing
suppositions regarding the conduct and outcome of the debate, to discussion of claims
to validity that everyone, everywhere could accept for the same reasons (Habermas,
1984). Only discussions relating to truth and to universalist morality were deemed to
fall into this category. In an essay first published in 1991, however, Habermas out-
lines a model of practical reason that allows for ethical-existential discourses (and,
indeed, pragmatic discourses) in addition to moral ones (Habermas, 1993). By intro-
ducing the category of ethical-existential discourses, he expands the framework of
his discourse theory to allow for validity-oriented, public debate on matters relat-
ing to what Charles Taylor calls “strong evaluations”: imperatives oriented towards
a goal that is posited as good for a given individual but is not reducible to subjec-
tive purposes or preferences (p. 5). Between Facts and Norms goes even further by
extending the category of ethical discourse to include public debates on shared strong
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evaluations: in such debates, referred to as ethical-political discourses, participants
seek to clarify their collective goals and collective self-understandings (Habermas,
1996, pp. 96–97). Importantly, however, Habermas retains a sharp distinction be-
tween ethical discourses and moral discourses. In his account, moral discourses are
concerned with the justification and application of norms that stipulate reciprocal
rights and duties; they aim towards reaching universal agreement concerning the uni-
versalizability of interests (Habermas, 1991, p. 149). Ethical discourses, by contrast,
involve the hermeneutical clarification of individual and collective self-understand-
ings and clinical questions of a happy or “not-failed” life; they aim to provide advice
concerning the correct conduct of life and the realization of personal or collective
life-projects (Habermas, 1996, pp. 8–9); the orientation towards validity built into
ethical discourses is construed as a concern to arrive at an outcome that is not univer-
sally valid but holds only “for me” or “for us” as members of a particular collective.
(Habermas, 1991, p. 149).
Habermas’s silence in Between Facts and Norms regarding public discussion of
religious convictions may be connected with the fact that religious validity claims do
not fit easily into either the category of moral discourses or the category of ethical dis-
courses: indeed, they seem to undermine the categorial distinction between universal
and non-universal validity claims on which his distinction between the two categories
of discourse is based. For Habermas, universal validity claims are claims that could be
accepted by everyone, everywhere for the same reasons5 evidently, he regards moral
claims as being of this kind; theoretical and empirical truth claims, too, are deemed to
belong in this category. Non-universal validity claims are claims that could win only
local acceptance because they are tied to the particular perspective of an individual or
collective; evidently, he regards ethical validity claims are being of this kind; aesthetic
validity claims, too, are deemed to belong in this category. The case of aesthetic validity
claims is especially relevant since Habermas appears to base their non-universality on
a world-disclosing function that he also attributes to religious claims.6 Drawing on the
writings of AlbrechtWellmer, Habermas links aesthetic validity claims to experiences
that show us the world in a newway, potentially changing every aspect of our everyday
life.7 This world-disclosing function creates problems so far as their universal accept-
ability is concerned. In order for aesthetic validity claims to be universally acceptable,
everyone, everywhere would have had to have undergone a similar world-disclosing
experience that resulted in their seeing the world in a similar new way. Furthermore,
this similar experience would have to be translatable into a mutually intelligible lan-
guage of justification. As I argued some years ago, the difficulties involved in meeting
these conditions mean that aesthetic validity claims are unsuitable candidates for
inclusion in Habermas’s category of universal validity claims.8 Since Habermas also
5 In the context of Habermas’s discourse theory, “universal acceptability” means, at a minimum,
acceptance by all participants in an argumentative procedure (discourse) that satisfies certain demand-
ing conditions such as inclusion of all relevant arguments, equal opportunity to exchange arguments,
shared concern to find the single right answer, etc.
6 In Habermas (1991), pp. 146–147, Habermas explicitly compares religious and aesthetic validity
claims with respect to their world-disclosing function.
7 See Habermas (1998). Here, Habermas cites Wellmer’s essay (1991).
8 Cooke (2001). Although I still regard my argument here as correct, I would now add that Haber-
mas’s difficulties are caused in significant part by his view that universal agreement must be actually
achievable. If we give up this view and, instead, interpret “universal acceptability” as a regulative
idea that has an orienting force but is not achievable in actual human practices, then it becomes
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attributes a world-disclosing function to religious validity claims, it may be presumed
that they, too, are unsuitable candidates. However, unlike aesthetic validity claims
(as Habermas construes them9), religious validity claims do not fit readily into the
category of non-universal validity claims either. To place them in this category would
be to ignore their evident universal orientation: their reference to a truth that holds
for everyone, everywhere.10 In sum, religious validity claims destabilize the very dis-
tinction between universal and non-universal validity claims.
At no point has Habermas explicitly drawn this conclusion; nor has he acknowl-
edged its implications for his discourse theory of democratic deliberation. He has,
however, drawn attention to the dilemma it creates for theology that is sympathetic
to postmetaphysical thinking (Habermas, 1991, pp. 128–148). In his discussion with
philosophers of religion and theologians in the late 1980s he makes the point that
however sympathetic theology may be to this kind of thinking, it cannot adopt the
attitude ofmethodological atheism appropriate for postmetaphysical philosophy in its
dealings with religious validity claims. If it is to be faithful to its own identity, theology
is obliged to see the claims to validity raised for religious teachings as analogous to
truth claims: as validity claims that are universal in reach, capable of being supported
by reasons that everyone, everywhere could accept. If it were merely to “cite” reli-
gious experiences, leaving aside the question of their truth or lack of it, it would have
to give up its claim to absolute validity: to a form of validity that transcends all merely
local evaluative contexts (p. 140). Consequently, Habermas sees only two avenues
open for a theology inclined towards postmetaphysical thinking. Either the “protes-
tant” avenue of appeal to a source of religious insight independent of reason or the
“enlightened catholic” avenue of appeal to an experiential basis tied to the language
of a particular tradition and susceptible to evaluation only within this tradition. In
the first case, theology severs the link between truth and argumentative justification,
which is one of the fundamental premises of postmetaphysical thinking. In the sec-
ond case, theology denies to religious arguments any claim to context-transcending
validity, thereby calling into question the theological enterprise’s reference to truth.
In other words, in Habermas’s work, at least up to and including Between Facts
and Norms, religious and theological validity claims pose the problem that they assert
universal validity for propositions and norms on which universal, discursively reached
agreement seem unattainable in practice. This inhibits any rational discussion of their
claims to validity in processes of democratic deliberation that accept the premises of
postmetaphysical thinking. Ethical validity claims, by contrast, are deemed to be open
to rational discussion, on the proviso that such discussion is confined to hermeneutic
elucidation and interpretation and leaves aside their orientation towards validity in
a universal sense.11 Habermas does not see this suspension of the question of ethi-
Footnote 8 continued
considerably easier to accommodate validity claims with a world-disclosing function in Habermas’s
schema of universal validity claims. See my discussion of regulative ideas in Cooke, 2006a.
9 Questions may justifiably be raised as regards Habermas’s characterization of aesthetic validity
claims as non-universal. Certainly, his position is at odds with Immanuel Kant’s views on the univer-
sality of aesthetic judgments. See Kant (1987).
10 In Habermas (1991), Habermas shows signs of acknowledging this universal orientation. See my
discussion in Cooke (2001b) pp. 235–236.
11 For an argument supporting the universality of ethical validity claims, see Cooke (2006a). As a gen-
eral ruleHabermas treats ethical validity claims as though they lacked any orientation towards validity
in a universal sense. On occasion, however, he acknowledges their orientation towards something that
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cal truth as a problem since he takes for granted that the citizens of contemporary
democracies, recognizing the plurality and intractability of ethical viewpoints, share
his view that the truth content of strong evaluations is not open to public assessment
and that they are not troubled by this.
As indicated, two societal factors appear to have motivated Habermas to propose
the inclusion of religious contributions in processes of democratic deliberation: the
instrumentalization of human nature threatened by developments in biotechnology
and the perceived emptiness of Western models of modernization. In both cases,
he worries that postmetaphysical thinking lacks the semantic resources necessary
for an adequate response. In addition, he is concerned to avoid the psychologically
burdensome split between religious identity and political identity that he sees as an
unwelcome by-product of Rawls’s approach to public reason. However, as we have
seen, his theory of validity claims (at least up to and including Between Facts and
Norms) is unable to accommodate public discussion of the truth content of religious
contributions. Habermas’s recent proposal invites us to consider whether he has mod-
ified his theory in order to allow for this kind of discussion, in particular, whether he
has redesigned his conceptual apparatus in order to permit thematization of the truth
content of propositions and norms, whose claims to truth are tied to experiences of
world-disclosure.
Closer consideration of his proposal reveals that he has not redesigned his the-
ory in this way. Instead, he endeavors to accommodate public discussion of reli-
gious validity claims within his existing conceptual apparatus by way of a distinction
between validity claims, whose cognitive contents are open to critical assessment and
validity claims, with whose cognitive contents postmetaphysical thinking must crit-
ically engage. This—implicit—distinction is evident, to begin with, in his restriction
of public discussion of religious truth claims to informal processes of democratic
deliberation.
As indicated earlier, Habermas’s proposal for the inclusion of religious contribu-
tions in democratic deliberation is accompanied by a crucial qualification. Thematiza-
tion of religious validity claims is held to be permissible only in the domains described
by Habermas as the weak publics of civil society, which are concerned primarily with
opinion-formation. In the model of law and politics presented in Between Facts and
Norms, these weak publics are demarcated from the formally organized, public sphere
of democratic legislation and decision-making, which comprises bodies such as the
parliament and the judiciary; this sphere is concerned primarily with “will-formation
and decision-making” (Habermas, 1996, pp. 304–308). The opinion-forming, weak
publics and the will-forming, legislative and decision-making bodies are presented as
distinct domains of public deliberation, although the importance of a permanent feed-
back relation between the two is emphasized. Contributions between theweak publics
and the legislative and decision-making bodies are filtered by a range of political insti-
tutions and offices. His call for the inclusion of religious contributions in democratic
deliberations relates solely to deliberations in the weak publics; in the legislative and
decision-making bodies, by contrast, only secular reasons are permissible. In conse-
quence, citizens who hold office in the legislative and decision-making bodies are
required to formulate their contributions to discussions in secular terms. Secular rea-
sons are reasons that are generally accessible: reasons that everyone accepts (or could
Footnote 11 continued
is held to be good unconditionally. See Habermas (1993), p. 5. He also hints at the universal moment
inherent in ethical validity in Habermas (1992), p. 187.
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come to accept in a process of public argumentation).12 This gives rise to a need for
translation: believers and non-believers must work together to translate the results
of their discussions in the weak publics into a commonly accessible, secular language
(Habermas, 2005b), pp.136–138.
The translation requirement recalls Habermas’s earlier requirement of methodo-
logical atheism as the appropriate attitude for postmetaphysical thinking in its deal-
ings with questions relating to the truth of religious validity claims. Common to
both requirements is the view that religious validity claims cannot be formulated
in a language that is generally accessible. Moreover, both are connected with the
view that only generally accessible reasons are permissible in discursive processes of
justification. As indicated above, “generally accessible” means potentially generally
acceptable: reasons that participants in discourse could come to accept as valid fol-
lowing the unconstrained exchange of arguments as part of a cooperative search for
truth; only such a view is compatible with Habermas’s emphasis on the transformative
power of argumentation. This emphasis in particularly evident in his account of public
deliberation on moral matters; here, the argumentative process is held to transform
perceptions of interests, indeed, it is held to generate the “moral point of view”.13
Interestingly, however, he seems to abandon his commitment to the transformative
power of argumentation when religious contributions are involved: the possibility
that secularly minded citizens could come to see the validity of religious contributions
appears to be excluded from the outset.14 A number of remarks lend support to this
impression: on various occasions he refers to the reasonable expectation of a lack of
agreement [Dissens] that accompanies participants in deliberations to which religious
contributions are admitted—an expectation that contrasts strikingly with the expecta-
tion of a reasonable consensus that, up to now, has been a cornerstone of his discourse
theories of truth, morality and even law and democracy.15
It is quite clear, therefore, that Habermas rules out the possibility of public assess-
ment of the truth of religious validity claims. It is equally clear, however, that, by
contrast with ethical validity claims, he does not want to confine public discussion
of religious validity claims to elucidation and interpretation of their contents. This
is evident, to begin with, in his explicit distinction between ethical discourses and
religious discourses.16 The passage in question makes clear that he sees no need for
public engagement with the cognitive contents of ethical convictions: no coopera-
tive endeavor to tap the semantic potential of ethical convictions is required—each
citizen (or group of citizens) must themselves find a way of translating their ethical
convictions into a language that is acceptable to everyone. In the case of religious
convictions, by contrast, a cooperative effort is necessary because such convictions
constitute a semantic resource for all citizens, believers and non-believers. The con-
trast with ethical claims is also evident in his repeated insistence that secularly minded
citizens (and postmetaphysical philosophy) must take seriously the “rational content”
12 In Habermas (2005b), Habermas makes quite clear that by “secular” reasons he means “generally
accessible reasons” (see, for example, pp. 137–138).
13 Habermas makes this quite clear in Habermas (2003c).
14 I make this point in Cooke (2006a).
15 In his writings on religion and politics, Habermas repeatedly refers to the reasonable expectation
of lack of agreement [Dissens]. See, for example, Habermas (2005a), p. 11, p. 146, p. 271, p. 249.
16 In a footnote to his essay on religion in the public sphere, Habermas (2005b), p. 138, Habermas
makes an explicit distinction between ethical discourses and religious discourses.
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or the “cognitive content” of religious views.17 Since, as we know, taking seriously the
cognitive content of religious convictions is not a matter of critical assessment of their
claims to validity, we need to consider exactly what it entails.
In attempting to ascertain what Habermas has in mind when he calls on secularly
minded citizens to engage critically, in cooperation with their religiously minded fel-
low citizens, with the cognitive contents of religion, it is helpful to consider his view
of how postmetaphysical philosophy can learn from the major religious traditions. He
himself draws an explicit comparison between the willingness to learn that is required
in each case (Habermas, 2005b, p. 138; 2005c, p. 255). He recommends that postmeta-
physical philosophy open itself to the power of religious imagery and narratives with
a view to seeing what it can salvage from these (bergen) for its own philosophical
projects. As in the case of democratic deliberation, salvaging the cognitive content
of religious traditions requires translation. Semantic contents count as cognitive if
they can be translated into discourses in which only “public” reasons count: reasons
that can be convincing beyond the boundaries of a particular community of faith.
(Habermas, 2005c, p. 255). Passages such as this make clear that the envisaged critical
engagement with the contents of religion is intended to produce images, intuitions,
and insights that enrich the purely secular vocabulary of postmetaphysical thinking: it
is not intended to cast light on the validity of religious truth claims. Examples he gives
of successful secular translations reinforce the point. Marx’s idea of an emancipated
society is mentioned as a secular translation of Kant’s idea of the Kingdom of God
on Earth (Habermas, 2005c, p. 240), Hegel’s concepts of “positivity”, “alienation”,
and “reification” are described as secular versions of concepts rooted in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition (p. 250) and Walter Benjamin’s idea of “anamnetic solidarity”
is regarded as a secularization of an idea indebted to belief in the Last Judgment.
(p. 250).
Evidently, therefore, Habermas has not changed his mind regarding the philosoph-
ical evaluation of religious truth claims: as in his previous writings, philosophy and
religion are deemed to constitute separate universes of validity.18 Themain difference
between his earlier and his present position regarding the relationship between phi-
losophy and religion is a heightened appreciation of the semantic power of religious
images, exemplary figures, and narratives; this heightened appreciation finds expres-
sion in the replacement in his recent writings of the earlier term “methodological
atheism” by the word “agnosticism” (Habermas, 2005b, p. 147). Nor has he changed
his mind with regard to public discussion of the truth contents of validity claims with a
world-disclosing function; public discussion of such validity claims is deemed permis-
sible only in processes of democratic deliberation in which not truth but meaning is at
issue. Here, the main difference between his earlier and his present position is a new
sense that it may be possible to extract meanings from religious contributions that
are meanings not just for individual citizens or groups of citizens but for all citizens,
believers and non-believers. In sum, by distinguishing critical engagement with the
cognitive contents of religious contributions from critical assessment of the validity of
these contents, Habermas seeks to enable social and political philosophy to retain its
commitment to postmetaphysical thinking, while at the same time asserting a concep-
17 See Habermas (2005a), p. 11, pp. 145–146, p. 271, p. 255.
18 His distinction between philosophical validity and religious validity is also very clear: in linewith his
earlier advocacy of methodological atheism, he continues to insist that philosophy and religion inhabit
two separate universes so far as their conceptions of truth is concerned. See Habermas (2005a), p. 10
and especially the argument he develops in his essay on Kant in this collection: Habermas (2005c).
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tion of public reason that acknowledges the interconnection of political and religious
identity and responding to the problem of semantic renewal.
In my view, his strategy is, in the first case, unsuccessful and, in the second, unsat-
isfactory. As I now argue, the translation requirement reproduces the Rawlsian split
between political and religious identity on the level of democratic legislation and
decision-making, giving rise to a conception of political autonomy that is biased in
favor of non-believers.19 With regard to the question of semantic renewal, I argue that
Habermas has not made clear how the meanings “salvaged” from religious traditions
can retain their semantic power within the framework of postmetaphysical thinking.
1. In calling for the inclusion of religious contributions in processes of democratic
deliberation, Habermas seeks tomaintain a unity between religious identity and polit-
ical identity that is lacking in the Rawlsian model of public reason. This is certainly a
step in the right direction. By allowing for public thematization of the commitments
and convictions that shape the identities of religious believers his proposal helps to
avoid the psychological difficulties resulting from theRawlsian conception. To be sure
there is still a split between political and religious identity on the level of the formally
organized, democratic legislative and decision-making process.However, on this level,
the split affects far fewer people since only citizens who assume official functions and
positions in the formally organized public sphere must leave behind their identities as
religious believers. Moreover, it is likely to be less burdensome for such citizens, since
they may be expected to accept the need to abstract from their religious identities
as the price to be paid for the privilege of holding political office. Nonetheless, even
on the level of formally organized legislation and decision-making, the split between
political and religious identities remains cause for concern. The problem is less the
psychological burden it imposes than its negative impact on the political autonomy of
religious believers.
A conception of political autonomy as self-legislation through rational processes
of collective will-formation is central to Habermas’s model of law and politics. The
basic intuition guiding this conception, which takes its inspiration from Rousseau and
Kant, is that citizens should be able to see themselves, at one and the same time, as
addressees of the law and as its collective authors (Habermas, 1996, p. 20). As he puts
it: “Citizens are politically autonomous only if they can view themselves jointly as
authors of the laws to which they are subject as individual addressees” (Habermas,
1995). Also central to his conception is the connection between authorship and argu-
mentation: citizens can see themselves as joint authors of the laws to which they are
subject only if they can see these laws as valid for reasons that prove themselves to be
generally acceptable in processes of rational argumentation.20 It is important to note
that “general acceptability” is understood by Habermas in a cognitive sense (Hab-
ermas, 1996, p. 101): political autonomy is based on rational insight into the validity
of laws and political decisions (p. 100). To be sure, under the complex conditions of
19 For convenience I have decided to stick with the terminology of “believer” and “non-believer” that
is favored by Rawls and Habermas. However, it is inaccurate and may be misleading. My discussion
in this article suggests that the relevant distinction is not between believers and non-believers but
between citizens who are metaphysically inclined and those who are postmetaphysically inclined.
20 A further important element of Habermas’s conception is the claim that political (“public”) auton-
omy and individual (“private”) autonomy are co-original and carry equal weight. Elsewhere I argue
that this “cooriginality thesis” can achieve its aims within Habermas’s theory only if private autonomy
is given an ethical interpretation: if it is construed as the capacity of the human individual to develop
and pursue her own conceptions of the good. See Cooke (1999).
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modern democracies, political autonomy is mediated by political representation and
is, accordingly, satisfied only indirectly and approximately. Nonetheless, it functions
as a regulative idea guiding citizens in their efforts to find the right laws and to make
the right political decisions.
The crucial question for our present purposes concerns the nature of the reasons
on which the perceived validity of laws rests. If moral autonomy is the freedom to
subject oneself to norms that are held to be valid for moral reasons and ethical auton-
omy is the freedom to pursue life-projects that are deemed worthwhile for ethical
reasons, political autonomy must be the freedom to subject oneself to laws that are
considered valid for political reasons.21 But what are political reasons? In Between
Facts and Norms Habermas distances himself from his earlier writings in which he
had conflated the domains of law and politics with the domain of morality and intro-
duces a distinction between moral discourses and political discourses.22 On this new
account, only moral reasons are allowed in moral discourse, whereas moral, ethical,
and pragmatic reasons are permitted in political ones. These different types of rea-
sons form a complex of practical validity claims that manifests the substantial unity of
practical reason in democratic deliberation.23 Given Habermas’s recent remarks on
the importance of religious discourses in democratic deliberation, it seems reasonable
to suppose that religious reasons, too, are part of this complex. On the other hand,
political validity is held to be governed by the democratic principle, which demands
general acceptability: according to this principle, only those laws and policies are valid
that could be accepted by everyone concerned in their capacity as participants in a
rational discourse (Habermas, 1996, pp. 107–111).
Evidently, there is a potential tension here between the plurality of types of rea-
sons that are deemed appropriate in political discourses, the alleged lack of general
acceptability of some of these types of reasons, and the posited link between political
validity and general acceptability. Habermas defuses the tension by making ethical
and religious neutrality a prerequisite of general acceptability: the reasons supporting
the validity of laws and political decisions may contain no evaluative judgments as
to the truth of ethical and religious worldviews; only such neutrality is deemed to be
compatible with postmetaphysical thinking (Habermas, 2005d, p. 86). This is why he
calls for the translation of religious and ethical contributions into a neutral, secular
language.24
However, if reasons based on ethical and religious worldviews are ruled out as
reasons for the acceptability of laws and political decisions, the resulting conception
of political autonomy is biased in favor of citizens with postmetaphysical worldviews.
Only such citizens can aspire towards self-legislation on the basis of rational insight.
21 Habermas insists on the distinction between moral autonomy and political autonomy. See Haber-
mas (2005d).
22 In Habermas (1996), p. 168, Habermas presents a model of rational political will-formation in
which ethical-political discourses feed into what he calls legal discourses. In his Postscript to that
work, however, he acknowledges that this schema is misleading, for political questions usually require
the simultaneous treatment of moral, ethical, and pragmatic aspects (p. 565, note 3). Since, in my view,
the term “political discourse” best captures Habermas’s intuition, I use that term in the following.
23 Cf. Habermas’s critique of Robert Alexy’s alleged “moralization” of law in Habermas (1996),
pp. 229–223.
24 We have seen that a cooperative translation effort is required in the case of religious validity
claims, whereas responsibility for the translation of ethical worldviews is placed on the citizens who
hold these worldviews.
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By contrast, citizens with what Habermas calls “heavy metaphysical baggage” are
denied the possibility of attaching a cognitive sense to the laws and political decisions
that they, in common with all other citizens, deem to be generally acceptable. This
is because context-transcending validity, for them, has an unavoidable otherwordly
aspect. At best they can regard the laws and political decisions in question as valid
in the sense of congruent with the premises of postmetaphysical thinking, which they
endorse, not because they are convinced of the rationality of its assumptions, but
for pragmatic or strategic reasons; they cannot see the laws and decisions as valid
for reasons that express their own, metaphysically based, views of validity. I develop
this argument in Cooke (2006b). This implies that the regulative force of the idea
of political autonomy, understood by Habermas as self-legislation based on rational
insight, is significantly impaired for religious believers and for those who hold ethical
worldviews of a metaphysical kind.
I have suggested that the exclusion of religious reasons from political delibera-
tion considerably weakens the regulative force of the idea of political autonomy for
those who hold religious (and other metaphysical) worldviews, hindering them from
seeing themselves as authors of the laws to which they are subject. This is a source of
political and social disaffection. Furthermore, since those who hold postmetaphysical
worldviews are able in principle to experience its full regulative force, a fundamental
inequality is built into the political order that is a further source of disaffection.
Habermas could avoid these problems by allowing for the inclusion of religious
(and other metaphysical) contributions on all levels of democratic deliberation: not
just in the informal, weak publics but also in the formally organized sphere of dem-
ocratic legislation and decision-making. But, as we know, he vehemently rejects any
such proposal, seeing it as “[violating] the principle that the powers of the state shall
remain neutral in the face of competing world-views.”25 Certainly, the principle of
neutrality should not be given up lightly. Like Habermas, I see the institutionalization
of this principle as the result of historical learning processes—accompanied by much
violence and suffering—in the course of which freedom of opinion has come to be
recognized as a democratic right: I too regard the secular state as a historical achieve-
ment (Habermas, 2005e, p. 322). However—and here, too, I agree with Habermas—I
regard historical learning processes as essentially open-ended, maintaining that his-
torical experiences are always subject to argumentative reinterpretation in light of
new situations that arise due to factors such as changed geopolitical constellations,
technological innovations, and ecological developments. Thus, I see no contradiction
between the view that the secularization and democratization of political authority
is a historical achievement and the view that a critical reevaluation of the need for a
principle of neutrality is necessary in the historical situation in which the inhabitants
of liberal democracies currently find themselves. Habermas himself acknowledges a
significant change in the current historical context when he refers to Germany and
other liberal democracies as post-secular societies: societies that have adapted to the
fact that religious communities continue to exist in a context of ongoing seculariza-
tion (Habermas, 2003b, p. 104). He also, as we have seen, highlights two features of
the changed context: the instrumentalization of human nature accompanying devel-
opments in biotechnology and the insecurity caused by terrorist attacks apparently
motivated by rejection of the emptiness of Western models of modernization.
25 This is his criticism of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s argument in favor of allowing the use of religious
reasons in political decision-making. See Habermas (2005b), p. 140, my translation.
Int J Philos Relig (2006) 60:187–207 199
The new historical situation in which we currently find ourselves, together with the
problems of disaffection and inequality resulting from the impaired political auton-
omy of religious (and othermetaphysically inclined) believers, suggest that it is time to
revisit the principle of state neutrality with regard to religious and ethical worldviews.
To be sure, caution is required. Any attempt to reconsider the principle of neutrality
must endeavor to hold onto the social, political, and intellectual advances that have
resulted from the secularization and democratization of political authority. Inmy view,
Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality, which ties validity to argumenta-
tion, expresses one of these advances: a “non-authoritarian” approach to questions of
truth and knowledge (Cooke, 2005, 2006a).Anon-authoritarian approach to truth and
knowledge denies that knowledge of truth is available independently of the linguistic
practices of human agents in historically specific, sociocultural contexts. In addition,
it ties knowledge of truth to argumentative justification. This entails the capacity and
willingness to support one’s validity claims with reasons in open-ended, inclusive, and
fair processes of argumentation in which participants are motivated by the search for
the single right answer. Thus, it rules out claims to have access to the right answer
independently of the exchange of arguments with others. Importantly, however, it
does not preclude religious or other forms of metaphysical thinking. In this regard,
Habermas’s view of religious thinking is too indiscriminate: he fails to distinguish
between religious beliefs that are epistemologically authoritarian and those that are
not. The former claim to have knowledge of truth without mediation through lan-
guage, in abstraction from history and context, and independently of argumentation;
the latter acknowledge the influences of language, history, and context on our knowl-
edge of truth and make such knowledge dependent on argumentative justification.
This lack of discrimination is apparent, for example, when he characterizes belief as
a form of knowledge that revokes the modern philosophical differentiation between
truth and certainty.26 I find it more helpful to distinguish between two alternative ways
of understanding the claims to truth of religious teachings. On the first understanding,
the truth of the teachings is grounded in the certainty of religious experience; the cer-
tainty of the experience, and by extension the truth of the teachings, is unshakeable
and hence immune to critical challenge. On the second understanding, by contrast,
the truth of the teachings is merely supported by religious experiences; these count as
evidence supporting claims to validity that must be subjected to critical interrogation
in argumentation. In both cases, truth itself is conceived of in metaphysical terms: as
unchanging and absolute. However, the interpretations differ in their views of what
kind of knowledge of truth is available to human beings. In the first case, final knowl-
edge is held to be available; this is what I refer to as an epistemologically authoritarian
position. In the second case, only fallible knowledge is held to be available; this is what
I refer to as an epistemologically non-authoritarian position. In short, a metaphysical
understanding of truth does not imply epistemological authoritarianism. This leads
me to suggest that it is not religious or other metaphysically based viewpoints that
should be excluded from processes of democratic legislation and decision-making but
viewpoints that are epistemologically authoritarian.
Habermas might accept that religious belief is compatible with a distinction be-
tween themetaphysical, unchangeable, and absolute character of truth and the related
26 This is how I interpret his reference to the epistemic status of religious belief as “a de-differ-
entiation of truth and certainty” (eine Entdifferenzierung von Wahrheit und Gewissheit). Habermas,
(2002).
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concepts of unconditional validity that guide religious thinking and action and the fal-
lible character of the knowledge of truth that is available to human beings. However,
he might still object to the inclusion of any kind of religious contributions in demo-
cratic legislation and decision-making on the grounds that the justification of religious
belief is a matter of revelation rather than argumentation. Presumably, his reference
to the world-disclosing function of religion is to be understood in this vein. This
view of the justification of religious validity claims is implicit in his characterization
of religious and philosophical truth as two distinct universes of validity and in his
call for critical engagement with the cognitive contents of religious contributions to
democratic discussion as opposed to critical assessment of their claims to truth. On
several occasions, moreover, he explicitly mentions the significance of revelation as
the basis for religious conviction (Habermas, 2005c, p. 252). In discussing Kierkeg-
aard, for example, he appears to accept his view that the “chasm between knowing
and believing cannot be bridged by thought” (Habermas, 2003d, p. 10). If this is so,
even a philosopher such as Kierkegaard, who accepts that our knowledge of God is
limited by the finite nature of human cognition and, accordingly, may be described as
epistemologically non-authoritarian, can see questions of religious truth as immune
to argumentative interrogation and justification.
However, here, too, there is a need for further distinction. Habermas’s view that
the dependency of the truth of religious validity claims on revelation makes them
immune to argumentative interrogation and justification is indicative of his tendency
to conflate two issues: the ways in which we experience the force of religious truth
(and, indeed, truth in general) and the ways in which the insights we acquire as a
result of such experiences may be critically examined. Distinguishing the two opens
the door for the argumentative interrogation and justification of religious validity
claims. It enables us to see that an individual who has acquired her sense of the truth
of religion by way of experiences of revelation (“world-disclosure”) is not therefore
necessarily unable to provide reasons in support of her religious validity claims in
argumentative exchanges with others.
Habermas has only recently begun to move away from a position that made argu-
mentation the privileged site for cognitive learning. This over-inflated view of argu-
mentation was a corollary of his—now abandoned—constructivist account of truth
and persists today in his constructivist account of moral validity (Habermas, 1973,
2003c). In these accounts, truth and justice are held to be constructed by way of the
argumentative exchange of reasons under ideal justificatory conditions. His construc-
tivist account commits him to the position that significant shifts in perception in rela-
tion to truth and justice come about by way of the intersubjective exchange of reasons.
Such a view of cognitive learning is quite implausible. Shifts in perception, moral, reli-
gious, and otherwise, generally occur as a result of new experiences that are prompted
by encounters with different cultures and different species, that arise out new life-
situations, that result from ecological and technological developments, and so on.27
Thus, we need to distinguish between the non-argumentative ways in which our sense
of the truth of propositions, norms, and viewpoints is acquired and openness to argu-
mentative interrogation of the validity of the propositions, norms, and viewpoints that
are subsequently asserted. If we do so, we can see that revelation does not necessarily
27 Albrecht Wellmer makes this point with regard to revisions in collective moral matrices: these “do
not as a rule take place only in the medium of argumentation, but under the pressure of a struggle for
recognition and under the influence of new experiences. See A. Wellmer (1991b).
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rule out argumentation. Of course, the demonstration that revelation and argumen-
tation are not incompatible does not yet say anything about the kinds of reasons that
could be brought to bear in critical discussion of the truth of religious validity claims.
The positive counterpart to my hitherto negative strategy calls for an account of the
ways in which critics and proponents of religious beliefs could interrogate and justify
the beliefs in questions. Elsewhere, I outline a model of practical reasoning that offers
some hints as to what such an account would look like (Cooke, 2006a, chapter 6).
I have suggested that the above distinction, together with the distinction
betweenepistemologically authoritarian andepistemologically non-authoritarian reli-
gious beliefs, may help to dispel Habermas’s reluctance to allow for the critical assess-
ment of the truth contents of religious validity claims in processes of democratic
deliberation. The advantage of these distinctions is that they allow for the inclusion of
reasons based on religious and other metaphysical worldviews in democratic legisla-
tion and decision-making without undermining the non-authoritarian impulse guiding
modern processes of secularization and democratization. We might say: they make
room for a post-secular state as the natural complement to a post-secular society.28
To be sure, my proposal to exclude epistemologically authoritarian contributions to
the process of democratic legislation and decision-making could be seen as more
stringent—and more difficult to implement—than Habermas’s proposal to exclude
religious contributions. I agree that the difficulties in implementing my proposal need
to be considered more carefully. However, I do not agree that its alleged stringency
constitutes an objection. All political orders are based on certain exclusions and
restrictions: the challenge for citizens of liberal democracies is not the elimination of
all exclusions and restrictions but only those that do not stand up to critical inter-
rogation in public processes of deliberation. My contention—admittedly, not argued
in sufficient detail here—is that there are good reasons for excluding authoritarian
modes of thinking and acting from democratic legislative and decision-making pro-
cesses, but that a blanket exclusion of religious contributions is not justifiable in the
present historical context. Elsewhere, I offer reasons in support of the first part of
this contention (Cooke, 2006a, chapter 6). The second part is supported by the case
I make above for including non-authoritarian religious contributions at all levels of
democratic deliberation. I have suggested that doing so enables (non-authoritarian)
religious believers to feel the full force of the regulative idea of political autonomy,
thereby removing one significant cause of disaffection for religious believers and
eradicating an inequality that currently exists between religious believers and non-
believers. It may even help religious believers who hold authoritarian views of truth
and knowledge to see that religious faith is not necessarily dependent on such views,
encouraging the kind of non-authoritarian approach, not just to cognition but also to
ethics and politics, that I see as a cornerstone of liberal democracy.
2. There is a second problem with Habermas’s proposal for a secular translation of
the contents of religious traditions: he passes too easily over the difficulties involved
in transposing images, figures, and narratives from a metaphysical framework into
a postmetaphysical one, simply taking for granted that the transposed contents will
retain a semantic power.
We will recall that Habermas sees religion as an important source of semantic
regeneration for postmetaphysical thinking in general, and for normative social and
political theory in particular. I have already mentioned the external, societal factors
28 I make the case for a post-secular state in Cooke (2006b).
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that, in his view, make the need for semantic renewal particularly urgent in the current
historical context; in addition, there is a factor internal to postmetaphysical thinking
that contributes to this urgency: its formal approach to questions of the good life. In
Habermas’s postmetaphysical account of ethics, this formal approach not only entails
abstention from specific pronouncements regarding the content of the good life, it
also implies handing over the responsibility for decisions regarding contents to the
individuals and collectives concerned. Accordingly, it can be said to prioritize free-
dom over virtue or happiness, placing value on the ethical autonomy of individual
subjects: on their freedom to develop and pursue their own conceptions of the good.
This formal conception of ethics is connected with a formal conception of moral
validity (“discourse ethics”), which makes the contents of moral norms and principles
dependent on processes of moral discourse, and with formal conceptions of law and
democracy, which makes the contents of laws and democratic decisions dependent on
the deliberative procedures of citizens.
However, the formal approach advocated by postmetaphysical thinking means
that ethical, moral, and political theories cannot themselves supply participants in
practical deliberations with the imaginative projections of the good life and the good
society that are necessary to orient and to motivate practical deliberation about the
proper goals of human action. It can be argued, therefore, that such theoriesmust look
outside of their own frameworks for alternative sources of meaning when the imag-
inative projections on which they traditionally relied no longer provide the required
orientation and motivation. In the past Habermas has been taken to task for failing
to take the question of semantic renewal in critical theory sufficiently seriously (See,
for example, Kompridis, 1999; Smith, 1997). His remarks on salvaging the contents of
religious traditions and making them fruitful for postmetaphysical thinking indicate
that he is now clearly aware of the problem and concerned to respond to it. His height-
ened awareness of the importance of religion as a semantic resource is particularly
evident in a recent essay on Kant’s struggle to give an account of the relationship
between faith and knowledge. In this essay, he criticizes Kant’s tendency to offer a
purely instrumental interpretation of positive religion. Against this, he points out that
positive religion, with its vivid exemplary figures, its inspirational stories of the lives
of the saints and prophets, its promises and miracles, and its suggestive images and
edifying narratives, serves as a source of inspiration for the development of philo-
sophical theories and concepts (Habermas, 2005c, pp. 231–235). He maintains that
practical reason must stir our imaginations with the help of secularized versions of
such images, figures, and narratives if it is to orient and motivate human beings to
work collectively towards realizing a secular version of Kant’s Kingdom of God on
Earth (pp. 230–231). However, here he seems to take for granted that the semantic
contents of religious traditions will continue to have the power to orient and motivate
our efforts to achieve a better society when released from their religious framework,
maintaining that images of “not-failed forms of life” can inspire us and encourage us
even without the certainty that God is waiting in the wings (p. 235).
Against this too ready presumption, I suggest that the transposition of the semantic
contents of religion into a postmetaphysical framework is not as simple as Habermas
seems to suppose. This is due to the dependency of the power of religious images, fig-
ures, and narratives on metaphysical assumptions. If they are to retain their semantic
power, therefore, the new postmetaphysical framework must supply equivalents for
these assumptions. Habermas does not acknowledge this complication. Nor can any
equivalents be extracted easily from his theory.
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The semantic power of religious contents depends above all on two kinds of meta-
physical assumptions. The assumption (a) that religious images, figures, and narratives
disclose forms of life that are valid in an unconditional sense and the assumption (b)
that the intentional actions of human beings can bring them closer to achieving the
disclosed forms of life. If postmetaphysical thinking is to be able to tap the power of
the semantic contents of religion, it must supply equivalents for these assumptions.
(a)Within a religious framework, validity in an unconditional sense (for shorthand,
I shall refer to such validity as truth) refers to an otherworldly, transcendent object.
The orienting andmotivating power of religious images, figures, and narratives derives
from their relation to this transcendent object.
In transposing semantic contents from a religious framework to a postmetaphysical
one, Habermas cannot simply jettison their reference to a otherworldly, transcendent
object but must supply some postmetaphysical equivalent. As we know, it is the ambi-
tion of his postmetaphysical theory to offer an innerworldly interpretation of the
unconditional: to rescue its sense without recourse to God or to an Absolute (Hab-
ermas, 2002, pp. 133–146). For this purpose, he proposes a deflationary interpretation
that locates the transcending power of the unconditional in the forms of commu-
nication through which we reach understanding with one another about something
in the world and about ourselves (Habermas, 2003d, pp. 9–10). The success of this
undertaking depends in large measure on the ability of his reconstructive analy-
ses of communicative practices (his “formal pragmatics”) to provide a secure foun-
dation for conceptions of validity that dispense with metaphysical projections yet
exert a context-transcending power. In recent years Habermas seems prepared to
admit that formal pragmatics cannot on its own yield the required notions of context-
transcending conceptions of validity.29 However, he has not made clear which sup-
plementary strategies are available to make good this deficiency.30 Until he does
so, his theory cannot convincingly claim to offer an interpretation of validity in an
unconditional sense (truth) that does not rely on metaphysical assumptions.
Thus, one of the tasks confronting him if he is to account for the orienting and
motivating power of secularized versions of religious images, figures, and narratives is
to supply a postmetaphysical conception of truth. A further task is to give an account
of the relationship between truth and the disclosed forms of life that avoids the objec-
tion of epistemological authoritarianism. I have asserted that we must posit some
kind of relationship between the two terms if we are to make sense of the orienting
and motivating power of images, figures, and narratives: we must be able to see the
forms of life they disclose as representation of truth. But there are different ways of
construing the relationship. One possibility is to see the disclosed forms of life as direct
representation of truth, unmediated by language, history and context. The advantage
of this is that it guarantees the unconditional validity of the disclosed form of life. The
disadvantage is that it is epistemologically authoritarian, for it implies that human
beings have access to final, unquestionable knowledge of truth. Another possibility is
to see the disclosed forms of life as an indirect representation of truth. On this account,
the disclosed form of life reveals something about truth, but what is revealed is med-
iated through language, history and context. Evidently, only an interpretation along
these lines is congruent with the premises of postmetaphysical thinking. However, if
Habermas is to offer this kind of interpretation of the relation between truth and what
29 See, for example, Habermas (2000). See also Habermas (2005f).
30 I argue this point in Cooke (2006a), esp. chapters 3, 5, and 7.
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is disclosed by way of images, figures, and narratives, he will have to reconsider his
position with regard to the critical assessment of ethical validity claims. For, clearly,
the disclosed forms of life amount to imaginative projections of ways of living one’s
life and of social conditions that claim to be the best for human beings. Since they are
construed, not as direct representations of truth, but as representations mediated by
language, history, and context, no single projection is indisputably valid. This raises
the question of howwe should assess their claims to validity—a question that becomes
increasingly urgent in historical contexts in which there are a plurality of competing
visions of the good life and the good society (Habermas, 2005c, pp. 248–249). In other
words, an epistemologically non-authoritarian account of the relationship between
the disclosed forms of life and truth calls for an account of how ethical-existential and
ethical-political validity claims can be assessed critically. But as we have seen, Haber-
mas continues steadfastly to reject the possibility of the critical assessment of ethical
validity claims. So long as he refuses to do so, however, he will be unable to account
for the semantic power of the images, figures, and narratives he seeks to salvage from
religious traditions.
(b) The semantic power of religious images, figures, and narratives depends not
only on the metaphysical assumption that the form of life they disclose represents
truth; it relies on the additional assumption that the right kind of intentional action
will bring human beings closer to achieving the disclosed forms of life. Without an
assumption of this kind, human beings would have no rational motivation for endeav-
oring to achieve ways of living and social conditions that are closer to the disclosed
images of the good life and the good society than other ones.
In his essay on Kant, Habermas offers an insightful reading of Kant’s concept of
rational belief that shows great sensitivity concerning the need for such an assumption
(Habermas, 2005c). Kant posits the assumption of God’s presence in human history
as a rational belief (Vernunftglaube) (pp. 222–232). Rational belief shares with philo-
sophical knowledge a reference to convincing reasons, while it shares with religious
faith an interest in the fulfillment of an existential hope (p. 230). The concept is intro-
duced by Kant in response to a difficulty connected with his position that the moral
law is inherently motivating, that observance of it is its own reward, and that there is
no necessary connection between the happiness deserved by a morally worthy person
and the actual happiness she enjoys in her life. This raises the problem of how to
make sense of unjust suffering and, more generally, of the connection between moral
action and moral consequences. Kant acknowledges that, as rational beings, we need
to assume that God is at work in human history, since it cannot be a matter of indiffer-
ence to reason whether suffering is unjust or just and whether morally good behavior
leads to individual or collective happiness. Existentially, too, we need to make such
an assumption in order to ward off the despair that looms when we encounter the
phenomenon of unjust suffering and when evil seems to triumph over morally good
action. In light of Habermas’s evident appreciation of the importance of such an
assumption, it is strange that he does not acknowledge the need for an equivalent
in his own critical social thinking.31 As in Kant’s moral theory, the question of the
relation between moral action and its consequences does not arise in Habermas’s
moral theory, since this theory is purely deontological: it confines itself to stipulat-
31 He merely comments that the intuition at the heart of Kant’s notion of rational belief reminds
us that the morally good must be sought in the concrete good of forms of life that have been made
better. See Habermas, (2005c), p. 235.
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ing what ought to be done from the point of view of a discursively reinterpreted
version of Kant’s moral law. Nonetheless, his evident appreciation of the problem
to which Kant responds with the notion of rational belief suggests awareness that
there are rational and existential gaps in his own moral theory that call for remedy
by an equivalent notion. Moreover, Habermas does not only offer a deontological
moral theory; he also offers a critical social theory that is concerned to point toward
emancipatory potentials in everyday communicative practices that human beings, by
their actions, should attempt to realize. It is of course in the context of his critical
social theory as a whole that he acknowledges the importance of images, figures, and
narratives in orienting and motivating human beings to work together with the aim
of achieving better forms of life. The question of the relation between action and
consequences cannot be a matter of indifference to that theory. It seems, therefore,
that Habermas needs something like Kant’s notion of rational belief, for without some
such notion, he will be unable to make sense of the orienting and motivating power
of the images, figures, and narratives that he seeks to salvage from religious tradition.
However, congruence with the premises of postmetaphysical thinking requires him to
develop a conception of rational belief that makes no reference to God or any other
otherworldly, transcendent objects. Not only has he not made any attempt to do so,
he has not, so far, acknowledged the need for a postmetaphysical equivalent for the
notion of rational belief.
My discussion has raised questions about Habermas’s proposal to salvage the con-
tents of religious traditions for social and political philosophy within a framework that
dispenses with metaphysical assumptions. On the political level, I expressed concern
regarding his requirement that only contributions that have been translated into a
postmetaphysical vocabulary may be considered in democratic processes of legisla-
tion and decision-making; my argument here is that a restriction of this kind results
in the impaired autonomy of religious believers and that, in the case of many reli-
gious believers, this impairment cannot be justified in the present historical context;
instead of a blanket exclusion of religious beliefs, therefore, I propose the exclusion
of beliefs that are epistemologically authoritarian. I subsequently examined the abil-
ity of Habermas’s theory to transpose the semantic contents of religious traditions
into a postmetaphysical framework without compromising the power of the images,
figures, and narratives concerned; here, I argue that Habermas has not yet confronted
the difficulties involved. Although I did not show that he is unable to resolve them,
my suspicion is that this is the case. As I argue in Re-Presenting the Good Society,2
metaphysical assumptions are unavoidable in critical social thinking; however, their
unavoidability does not have to be cause for concern. In this regard, too, the distinction
between epistemologically authoritarian and non-authoritarian approaches is useful.
Clearly, many traditional metaphysical theories contain elitist, absolutist, and ahistor-
ical elements that lead to epistemological authoritarianism (Cooke, 2001, pp. 70–71);
as such they are out of step with the conception of “situated rationality” integral to
the self-understanding of contemporary social and political philosophy and should
be rejected.32 But commitment to metaphysical assumptions does not lead inevitably
to epistemological authoritarianism. Jettisoning the elitist, absolutist, and ahistorical
elements of traditional modes of metaphysical thinking, we can endeavor to develop
non-authoritarian modes; metaphysical thinking of this kind acknowledges that its
guiding assumptions are mediated by language, history, and context and understands
32 I discuss the concept of situated rationality at some length in Cooke (2006a).
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them not as indisputable claims about the structures of the mind or the world, but as
arguments that raise claims to validity that can be subjected to critical interrogation
in open-ended, inclusive, and fair processes of public argumentation (Cooke, 2006a,
chapter 6).
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